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Abstract 
 
Health insurance reform for rural China is at a crossroads. The achievements of recent reform 
initiatives appear remarkable as measured by coverage through the New Cooperative Medical 
Scheme (NCMS); yet there is little evidence that NCMS has made major strides toward 
improving the financial protection of health care for the rural population. Our assessment 
suggests that the system may become trapped in a vicious cycle of increases in government 
subsidies and resulting cost escalations in health care due to strategic responses among health 
care providers, a factor that hitherto has been largely overlooked. We argue that to improve the 
sector’s overall performance, a thorough reform is needed to change provider payment 
incentives. Attention should also be directed to strengthening the ability of government 
agencies to manage health insurance funds effectively through their roles as purchasers and 
third-party payers. 
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Introduction 
Policy changes in health insurance for China’s rural population in recent decades can best be 
described as pendulum swings. Before 1978, the vast majority of the rural population was 
covered by the Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS), under which access to basic health 
services was provided at relatively low cost. The economic reforms launched at the end of 
1970s led to the collapse of People’s Collective Communes, the institutional backbone of CMS, 
and the rural population was left almost completely on their own to pay for health care. The 
absence of insurance coverage, coupled with the introduction of fee-for-service (FFS) payment 
requirements in the health system, rendered health services unaffordable for the majority of the 
rural population: according to a national survey, about three-quarters of rural residents no 
longer sought care when recommended (Gu, 2008, Gu, 2012).  
 
The New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) introduced in 2003, formed part of a shift in 
the opposite direction. Subsidised heavily by the government at different levels, the scheme 
aimed at providing universal coverage for basic health care for rural residents regardless of 
individual characteristics, including job and socioeconomic status, education, pre-existing 
health conditions, or level of wealth. Thus far individual contributions to the insurance 
premium by rural residents have remained low. To improve enrolment into the plan, the 
government has substantially increased its contribution to the individual premium, from merely 
10RMB (US$1.60) in 2003 to 240RMB ($38.51) in 2012.   
 
The expansion of NCMS has been remarkable by any measure: 726 million rural residents in 
2,448 counties were covered under the program by 2008 (You and Kobayashi, 2009), and 
coverage reached 97.5% by 2012, making NCMS arguably the largest medical security 
program in the world (Table 1). More importantly, the benefit package for the insurance plan, 
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which was initially meant for catastrophic illness, was expanded in 2007 to include outpatient 
and preventive care (Xinhua, 2012).   
 
<Table 1 about here> 
 
Beyond these official statistics, however, performance assessment of NCMS has delivered less 
optimistic results.  The main goal of the program is to protect households against the financial 
risk of ill-health by reducing patients’ liability for the cost of catastrophic illness (Babiarz et 
al., 2012, Zhang et al., 2010a). Yet, there is little evidence that the program has made major 
strides toward that objective. Studies have shown that NCMS has had limited impact on out-
of-pocket payment reduction; in some cases, health care payments in fact increased (Wagstaff 
et al., 2005, Sun et al., 2010, Sun et al., 2009, Yip and Hsiao, 2009b). Some scholars have 
pointed to a few fundamental flaws in the structure and management of NCMS, such as its 
payment system and its high drug costs, as the main obstacles that have prevented the program 
from reaching its full potential (Yip and Eggleston, 2004, Yip and Mahal, 2008, Yip et al., 
2010, Wagstaff et al., 2009, Wagstaff and World Bank., 2009). 
 
The analysis presented in this paper provides a critical assessment of rural health insurance 
reforms in recent years, in particular, of NCMS, by drawing on the available peer-reviewed 
literature and relevant data from official government sources. Our assessment of the current 
reform effort for NCMS, adopting a conceptual framework introduced by the World Health 
Organization (WHO, 2000), focuses on several key functions in public health care financing— 
out-of-pocket payment, the benefit package, provider payment methods, and purchasing— to 
shed light on a number of fundamental shortcomings of the current reform efforts.  Our 
conclusions point out a number of key issues of the NCMS, i.e. low reimbursement rates, high 
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co-payments, limited insurance benefit package, and lack of third-party purchaser. In addition, 
we also suggest a thorough reform of provider incentives. The Chinese policy makers must not 
only focus on the design of a health insurance scheme, and it is equally important to look at 
structural problems of the Chinese healthcare system. Most healthcare facilities in China rely 
heavily on direct health services and prescription drug revenues to survive, even if we increase 
the reimbursement rates or insurance benefit package, the availability of insurance funds may 
create incentives for price hikes, which insured patients (and the uninsured as well) are helpless 
to combat.  
 
The following sections discusses the rural health insurance system in China, followed by a 
critical appraisal of the NCMS, policy lessons and a discussion.  
 
 
Evolution of the health insurance system in rural China 
Social insurance, including coverage for rural areas, had been a major source of health care 
financing in China before the economic reforms of 1978. Health care for the majority of rural 
residents China was covered by the Cooperative Medical Scheme (CMS), under which rural 
residents paid small sums to help finance basic services from grassroots doctors. This scheme 
played an important role in ensuring access to basic health services and essential medicines for 
rural residents at a relatively low cost and comprised a critical part of China's health care 
system, which was heralded at the time as a successful model for managing public health care 
in the developing world (Zhang et al., 2010b, Ma et al., 2012).  
 
With the disbanding of the People’s Collective Communes, which formed the institutional 
backbone of CMS, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the rural health care previously 
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financed and provided through CMS could no longer be sustained (Ma et al., 2012, Yan et al., 
2011). At the end of the 1970s, before the reforms took hold, 90% of the rural population had 
access to care of reasonable quality and some protection against catastrophic expenses, but 
within a decade that proportion had shrunk to 5%: rural residents were left almost completely 
on their own to pay for health services (Ooi, 2005). 
 
Although the Chinese government tried to revive CMS during the 1980s and 1990s, these 
efforts proved futile and the situation continued to deteriorate, especially in the 1990s, when 
reforms toward the marketisation of health facilities were implemented fully. The number of 
village health personnel decreased by 18-23% depending on the estimate, and the number of 
health facilities in towns and villages also decreased significantly. More importantly, due to 
lack of government support in financing and support for health care, fee-for-service (FFS) 
payment arrangements were introduced in the rural health care system (Henderson et al., 1995, 
Akin et al., 2004, Yip and Eggleston, 2004). As a result, the average per episode out-of-pocket 
payment for inpatient care in rural areas increased from 613RMB ($106.39) in 1993 to 
2,649RMB ($320.04) in 2003 (Chen et al., 2011, You and Kobayashi, 2009), while the 
proportion of rural residents who did not seek care when recommended reached 75.4%. 
Because the majority of the country’s population resided in rural areas, it became clear that 
lack of access to health care, if left unaddressed, could seriously undermine the political 
legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party.   
 
NCMS was launched in 2003 in response to the dire need for access to affordable health care 
for the rural population. Although bearing a name derived from its highly regarded predecessor, 
NCMS differs from the old CMS along several key dimensions (Table 2). NCMS is a 
government-subsidised and voluntary scheme, which makes it attractive to low-risk 
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households. The premium is subsidised by the state with individuals making modest 
contributions initially. In many regions, participants were expected to contribute only about 
10RMB (US$1.21) per person per month in 2003, the remainder being payable by central and 
local governments. Second, participation in NCMS provides rural residents with access to a 
range of health care facilities, from village clinics to municipal hospitals, although the 
reimbursement rates for health services received differ from one type of facility to another. 
Third, NCMS is administered at the county level, and although it offers participants the 
advantages of pooled resources, there are significant disparities in these pooled resources 
across different counties. For example, in the more affluent eastern and coastal regions, local 
governments are able to invest funds to augment the government subsidy, thus supporting more 
comprehensive coverage to their residents (Yang, 2013).  
 
<Table 2 about here> 
 
As a voluntary insurance plan, NCMS experienced a very low enrollment rate during its early 
years. With a low level of government subsidies, the program was initially an insurance plan 
covering primarily catastrophic illness, with deductibles; this plan offered few enrollment 
incentives to rural residents who had a low degree of health risks (WHO, 2004: 14). Over time, 
however, the plan has become more comprehensive and has attracted a significant injection of 
government subsidy. Although it varies among provinces, an individual’s contribution to the 
insurance premium is kept relatively low, and this premium is usually heavily subsidised by 
the government. The government’s contribution to the individual subscriber’s monthly 
insurance premium increased from 10RMB ($1.21) in 2003 to 240RMB ($30.02) in 2012; and 
since 2007, coverage has expanded from mainly catastrophic illness to outpatient and 
preventive care (Xinhua, 2012). In addition, expansion and maintenance of NCMS coverage 
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has become a key performance indicator among government officials, and administrative 
means have been employed to further that goal. Expansion since 2007 has been quite 
remarkable with NCMS coverage reaching 97.5% coverage of China's 857 million rural 
residents by 2012.  
 
Despite its rapid expansion, studies thus far have yielded mixed reviews of the performance of 
the NCMS around a number of key criteria. Scholars have argued that the NCMS was not able 
to provide adequate financial protections for rural households, and thus called for a more 
generous package. A 2004 WHO report suggested that the NCMS overly emphasized medical 
catastrophe at the expense of the health needs of the majority of the rural population because 
the number of farmers falling into poverty due to medical expenses was likely to be small 
(World Health Organization, 2004b).  The NCMS may also inflate medical costs at lower levels 
of health services hierarchy that tend to over-prescribe for patients covered by NCMS (Sun et 
al., 2009a, Sun et al., 2009b).  
 
 
A critical assessment of the NCMS 
Drawing from the above discussion, four key areas have been identified and provide causes for 
concern about the insurance’s performance and overall sustainability: (a) low reimbursement 
rates and high co-payments at the point of care; (b) a limited benefit package; (c) problems 
with the FFS system and supplier-induced demand for insured patients; and (d) the 
government’s neglect of opportunities to act as a third-party negotiator of services and prices 
on behalf of the program’s subscribers. 
 
Low reimbursement rates and high co-payments at the point of care 
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It is widely recognized that NCMS has thus far not succeeded in consistently and substantially 
lowering out-of-pocket costs for patients who subscribe to its program 
(Yip and Mahal, 2008, Yip et al., 2010, Yip and Hsiao, 2009a, Anson and Shifang, 2005, 
Babiarz et al., 2010, Hao et al., 2010). Out-of-pocket payments remain a significant financial 
burden for rural households and that financial protection from NCMS was rather limited (Sun 
et al. 2010). Although NCMS has reached most of the country’s rural areas, it has failed to 
cover large medical expenses (particularly for outpatient care) because copayments are usually 
high (Zhang et al. 2010b).   
 
Failure to reduce out-of-pocket costs to subscribers is not an issue confined only to NCMS. 
Out-of-pocket spending for health care has increased following the introduction of other forms 
of health insurance as well (Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008).   
 
A limited benefit package   
An important contributing factor to the failure of NCMS to adequately protect insurees from 
financial risks is the limited benefit package it offers. The plan’s benefit package mainly 
concentrates on inpatient and catastrophic care, offering outpatient care only for a limited roster 
of diseases. When the plan was first initiated, a large proportion of cost-effective primary 
interventions, or outpatient care were excluded from the benefits package.  Outpatient care, 
however, is not an inexpensive service for the plan’s rural subscribers and having to pay for it 
out-of-pocket could lead to poverty (Kavosi et al., 2012, Szwarcwald et al., 2010, Wagstaff et 
al., 2005).  Lack of coverage for outpatient care may also lead to insurees becoming seriously 
ill because they cannot afford primary care including prevention that might address their health 
problems early on (Hu et al., 2011). Although NCMS extended its coverage to outpatient care 
in 2007, reimbursement for services provided is made either through the insuree’s medical 
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savings account or through county-level pooled funds that require substantial cost-sharing 
(Barber and Yao, 2011).  
 
Although coverage of catastrophic illness remains the NCMS’ primary objective, only a small 
number of severe diseases are included in its list of illnesses eligible for coverage and full 
reimbursement.  This is because catastrophic treatments and financing are often provided at 
higher-level health facilities, such as township, county, or city hospitals. Some common life-
threatening diseases, such as lung cancer, are not included in the list of eligible conditions for 
coverage, and co-payments for inpatient care of these remain high even after claims for 
allowable costs are paid (Liu et al., 2012, Wang et al., 2012a, Wang et al., 2012b, Zhou et al., 
2011). 
 
Problems arising from NCMS’s inadequate benefit package have been further exacerbated by 
significant regional disparities in economic development in China. Because individual 
subscribers and local governments are required to contribute to the individual’s insurance 
premium in addition to the contribution made by central government, subscribers and localities 
in less wealthy areas, are often unable to contribute as much to this total premium as are their 
counterparts in in more affluent areas. In western and central China, where the level of 
economic development remains low, local governments as well as rural residents have a limited 
capacity to finance the overall program adequately; in the more prosperous eastern and coastal 
region, the insurance benefit package is usually much more comprehensive, as local 
governments and residents, even rural households, are better able to contribute resources to 
finance treatments that the basic NCMS package does not cover. 
 
Provider payment incentives under a FFS health system   
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The effectiveness of NCMS has been undermined by the prevailing payment mechanism for 
health care in China, a FFS system that allows health care providers to make a profit on services 
rendered and also to profit from related prescription drug sales (Wagstaff and World Bank, 
2007, World Bank, 1997). As most health care facilities rely heavily direct health services and 
prescription drug revenues to survive (Latker, 1998, Yip and Hanson, 2009, Yip and Hsiao, 
2008), the availability of insurance monies (e.g. NCMS reimbursements) for claims may create 
incentives for price hikes, which insured and uninsured patients are unable to address 
effectively. Studies have also found that over-prescription of antibiotics in village clinics is 
common for patients covered by NCMS (Sun et al., 2009, Bogg et al., 2010). Village clinics 
and township health centres in counties covered by NCMS have tended to generate more 
revenues than similar facilities in counties not participating in the program (Babiarz et al., 
2012), and the care delivered at participating facilities was also found to be more costly and 
more sophisticated than medically necessary (Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008). One study (Bogg 
et al., 2010) reported in particular an alarming increase in Cesarean delivery rates and costs 
after NCMS was launched. 
 
In recent years, a number policies and regulations designed to alter the perverse incentive 
embedded in the FFS payment system have been initiated. For instance, prospective payment 
methods have been used to make providers bear the financial risk of overprescribing and to 
provide incentives for providers to reduce inefficient use of services. Evidence has begun to 
arrive that points to positive effects from using prospective payment methods to regulate 
provider behaviors (Luo, 2011, Jiao et al., 2013), but successful broad-scale implementation 
will necessarily depend on the capacity of the local government agencies in insured areas, 
which are in effect the managers of the insurance program at the level most qualified to closely 
monitor provider behaviors. Particular examples of prospective payment methods that might 
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be suitable for application in China include diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment, and 
capitation (Yip and Hsiao, 2009a), but government agencies, as the insurers, must not only be 
able to establish appropriate service-specific standards with regard to the package of services 
to be delivered, but also closely monitor providers’ performance and enforce those standards. 
 
Lack of progress in third-party price negotiations 
Moreover, due to widespread asymmetry of information in the health care market, insured 
subscribers to NCMS and other government-sponsored health insurance plans must rely on the 
government itself as a knowledgeable third-party purchaser to act on their behalf in negotiating 
the prices and quality of services they receive from providers. However, there is little evidence 
that NCMS has made noticeable progress in that direction. Generally speaking, the larger the 
share of provider revenue that the purchaser can control, the more likely it will be that the 
purchaser can leverage desired performance from providers. Yet purchasers for NCMS cover 
only a limited range of inpatient and outpatient services, and the plan may exert little influence 
over the provision of care, because (owing to providers’ receipts of FFS payments from other 
sources) it only represents a small share of provider income.  
 
In addition, to transform NCMS into a proactive purchaser of health care on behalf of its 
subscribers would require effective coordination of different levels of local health authorities 
and providers, a task that would demand significant changes in existing institutional 
arrangements.  
 
Although NCMS has thus far shown limited capability in utilizing its purchasing power, some 
experimental efforts have shown promising results. In Shanghai, purchasing can now only be 
made based on the most cost-effective choices for each treatment plan. For example, a hospital 
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is allowed to offer and use a maximum of two pharmaceutical products that share the same 
formula, selected according to their cost-effectiveness (Yang, 2009). Some Western regions, 
taking into account evidence of provider performance as well as village-level ratings of services 
provided, have created “fund boards,” comprised of village representatives, government 
officials, township health center directors, and auditors, to act as a single purchaser and to make 
purchasing decisions (Wang et al., 2009). In this system, insurers will still be able to exercise 
some influence over purchasing decisions in these areas. It is too early to tell whether these 
cost-effective limits set on hospital purchases, or locally comprised purchasing boards can be 
sustained in the long run, and, more importantly, whether they will prove to be applicable in a 
wide range of circumstances. 
 
A Vicious Cycle? 
The failure of NCMS to protect China’s rural population from the financial risks of health care 
by reducing its subscribers’ out-of-pocket payments for services and medications has led to 
political pressure for more a “generous” insurance package financed through increased 
government subsidies (Ma et al., 2012). The tremendous economic growth in China during the 
decades since 1980 has put the Chinese government in an enviable position to address this 
concern by injecting massive funding into health care financing. The upsurge in its contribution 
to the individual subscriber’s insurance premium, from merely 10RMB (US$1.60) in 2003 to 
240RMB ($38.51) in 2012, is a clear indication of the government's commitment to 
improvements in the program. Some further government initiatives under consideration include 
merging NCMS with the Urban Residents Insurance Scheme and the establishment of a 
uniform insurance scheme for the country’s entire population.  
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Spending more money may seem an easy remedy in the context of burgeoning government 
revenues. But our assessment of overall performance by NCMS to date shows that increased 
government subsidies in financing health insurance will not necessarily lead to better outcomes 
if strategic responses to this increased funding, on the part of affected health care providers, 
are not taken into consideration. As mentioned above, evidence has shown that health care 
providers in China may supply high-margin, high-tech care and sophisticated medicines to 
NCMS patients at every opportunity, however justified, and that insured patients have often 
paid more than warranted for their treatments (Hu et al., 2009, Yip and Hsiao, 2009b). Health 
care providers, who for survival rely largely on revenue from services rendered and from sale 
of prescription drugs, are also likely to charge more as insurance subsidization rises and the 
benefits package becomes more comprehensive.  
 
Thus repeated increases in government subsidization may feed into a vicious cycle, in which 
health care providers’ strategic responses rise to meet the new infusion of funds, Increased 
subsidization also leads to more comprehensive benefit coverage, which induces a rise in 
providers’ billings for new medical services and medications. Out-of-pocket expenditures for 
patients would not decrease and could even increase, as expansion of the benefit packages and 
resulting service improvements lead to increased claim rates, and coverage of illnesses is 
outpaced by rises in health care expenditures, creating political pressures for more government 
subsidies--which will in turn perpetuate the cycle of strategic response (Figure 1).   
 
<Figure 1 about here> 
 
Policy Implications 
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Health insurance reform for rural China, now at a crossroad, must take steps to avoid 
perpetuating that vicious cycle while continuing to build on the positive successes of NCMS 
over its first decade in operation. Reform initiatives expanding coverage appear to have 
achieved a dramatic rise in enrollment in the program, which is now available in almost all 
areas of the country and covers 97.5% of the rural population. The critical assessment presented 
here, based on existing empirical evidence from numerous studies, has explored several 
fundamental shortcomings that have emerged in the program—its failure to reduce patients’ 
out-of-pocket expenditures, its still-limited benefits package, its difficulties in countering 
providers’ strategic responses to increased subsidies and expanded benefits, and its slowness 
in exerting its potential powers as a third-party purchaser of health services and medications 
for its subscribers. But our research also reports several promising efforts toward containing 
costs and controlling provider behavior that could prove to be widely applicable across the 
great variety of circumstances and locations that NCMS must address.  
 
It may seem appealing and financially viable for the government to augment the program’s 
benefit package through the provision of greater funding, a policy it has pursued since the 
NCMS’ inception in 2003. Our analysis instead points to the danger of once again becoming 
trapped in the vicious cycle of strategic responses to increased subsidies, that is, provider 
behaviors that escalate costs and thus in turn necessitate further subsidies. If the substantial 
increase in government subsidies in financing NCMS has not yet resulted in the positive 
changes intended, it is a wishful thinking to believe that simply injecting more funds into the 
program will alone slow the trend toward ever-higher costs.  
 
Our analysis also suggests that the FFS system, China’s predominant payment method for 
health care services, feeds the vicious circle of funding and strategic response and leaves 
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NCMS subscribers still vulnerable to price hikes and unregulated overuse of services.  
Ineffective use of the government’s tremendous purchasing power as a third-party negotiator 
for pricing of services and medications for its subscribers has been another major obstacle 
fulfilling the program’s objective of lowering costs to individual subscribers. We argue that 
although it seems imperative for NCMS to move away from FFS payment arrangements, the 
success of such a change would depend critically upon the capacity of government agencies to 
address the challenges arising from adoption of untested alterative payment methods. Similarly, 
the capacity deficit is a major constraint for government agencies aspiring to be effective 
mangers of health insurance funds by using their roles as third-party negotiators and purchasers 
to improve the sector’s performance and provide NCMS subscribers with protection against 
cost escalations and against undiminished or increased out-of-pocket health care expenditures, 
which have hitherto often been the unintended price of expanded coverage and increasingly 
subsidised premiums. 
 
Finally, while this paper used China as a case study, the experience of China can shed some 
light on other countries with similar health system and economic development. For instance, a 
number of countries in South and Southeast Asia have big rural population, and use FFS as the 
provider payment mechanism, e.g. India and Vietnam (Wagstaff, 2007a, Liu et al., 2012c). 
These countries also encountered problems of supplier-induced demand under health 
insurance. China’s experience suggests that, without a clear understanding of the health care 
system and governance framework that support it, the intended benefits of any health insurance 
program will be difficult to realise (Ramesh et al., 2012). New measures in improving access 
should be directed not only at offsetting rising costs, but also at designing and implementing 
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reforms in changing provider payment incentives in participating health service facilities, in an 
effort to make best use of the public financing in the long term.   
 
 
Note: 
1. Currency conversion is based on official nominal exchange rates at the year.  
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Figure 1. A vicious cycle of more comprehensive benefit package 
 
 
Source: The authors. 
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Table 1. Recent changes in NCMS insurance coverage 
 
Year 
Counties 
participating 
Enrolment  
(100 million) 
Enrolment  
as % of  
total population 
Average government 
subsidy   
per participant 
(RMB) 
2005 678 1.79 75.66 42.10 
2006 1451 4.1 80.66 52.10 
2007 2451 7.26 86.20 58.90 
2008 2729 8.15 91.53 96.30 
2009 2716 8.33 94.19 113.36 
2010 2678 8.36 96.00  156.57 
2011 2637 8.32 97.5 246.2 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011) 
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Table 2. Comparable features of NCMS and CMS 
 NCMS (2003 onwards) CMS (late 1950s to early 
1980s) 
Date started 2003 (Pilot scheme was initiated 
in four provinces) 
From late 1950s onwards 
Enrolment  Voluntary at household level  Mandatory at individual level 
(You and Kobayashi, 2009) 
Coverage 94.3 % in 2009 Less than 10 % in the 1990s 
(Sun et al., 2010) 
Policy guidance General policy guidance are issued 
by the central government, local 
governments retain considerable 
discretion over the details 
No policy guidance from central 
government 
Administration County government sets the 
reimbursement rate, ceilings, 
medical saving account, etc.  
Village levels (People’s 
Collective Communes) 
Risk pooling County level Township or village level 
Target population Rural residents (840 million) Rural residents 
Financing mechanism In western and central China, the 
central government assisted the 
local government in providing 
financing for the scheme. In the 
more affluent eastern and coastal 
region, financing the premium was 
mainly through local 
government’s general taxes. 
Supported entirely by state 
funding. Care was provided by 
barefoot doctors, including basic 
outpatient services, emergency 
first aid, immunizations, public 
health surveillance (Babiarz et 
al., 2010).  
27 
 
Designated health 
facilities  
All levels of health facilities Barefoot doctors affiliated with 
the People’s Collective 
Communes 
Covered services Inpatient services, catastrophic 
outpatient services, some 
prevention care services 
Prevention care and outpatient 
care (You and Kobayashi, 2009) 
  
 
 
